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ROGER THAT: CALLING AN AUDIBLE ON THE NFL COMMISSIONER'S FINAL 






The National Football League (the “NFL”) is the most popular and most valuable 
sports league in the United States.1 In 2018, the NFL accounted for 46 of the top 50 most-
watched shows on television,2 including NBC’s “Sunday Night Football” which continued 
its streak as the number one primetime show for the eighth consecutive year.3 Additionally, 
the NFL generates the most revenue of any professional sports league, holds the most 
valuable franchises,4 and attracts the highest per game attendance numbers.5 
 As an employer, discipline is of paramount important to the NFL.6 Without an 
effective discipline policy in place, employers subject themselves to major risks.7 Every 
NFL team employs somewhere between 43 and 53 players throughout each season, which 
results in up to 1,696 players employed by the league in a given year.8 Accordingly, up to 
1,696 NFL employees are subject to the NFL’s player discipline policy on a yearly basis. 
In the 2019 season, 62 players were suspended.9 This has been an upward trend in 
the league since the last collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) was signed in 2011.10 
 
 Kyle Yager is a J.D. candidate at Penn State Law, class of 2021, and an associate editor of the Penn State 
Arbitration Law Review.  
 





3. TV News Desk, RATINGS: NBC Sees Most-Watched SUNDAY NIGHT FOOTBALL Game Ever, 
Broadway World (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.broadwayworld.com/bwwtv/article/RATINGS-NBC-Sees-
Most-Watched-SUNDAY-NIGHT-FOOTBALL-Game-Ever-20190930. 
 
4. Christina Gough, National Football League (NFL) – Statistics & Facts, Statista (Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://www.statista.com/topics/963/national-football-league/. 
 
5. Id.    
 
6. See Employee Discipline, 16 ANDREWS EMP. LITIG. REP., no. 6, 2001, at 12. 
 
7. See id. 
 
8. See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (Aug. 4, 
2011), https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf. 
 
9. NFL Fines & Suspensions, Spotrac, https://www.spotrac.com/nfl/fines-suspensions/2019/suspensions/  
(last visited July 27, 2020). 
 
10. See NFL Fines & Suspensions, supra note 9. 
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The NFL has suspended 468 players for various infractions in the last eight years.11 By 
comparison, between 2002 and 2011, the NFL suspended a total of 82 players.12 This 
means that the most recent CBA, and the subsequent Personal Conduct Policy (the “PCP”) 
that slightly modified the CBA, has resulted in over five times the amount of player 
suspensions as the previous agreement. This disparity is highlighted by multiple highly 
publicized, high-profile player cases involving players like Adrian Peterson,13 Ezekiel 
Elliot,14 and Tom Brady.15  
The purpose of this article is to advocate for a change to the NFL’s player 
disciplinary appeals process. Specifically, this process needs to be changed from the 
current system, where the Commissioner is authorized to assume the role as the sole and 
final arbitrator, to a neutral arbitration process. This article will begin by giving a brief 
overview of the CBA in part two. Part three will explain the Commissioner’s powers 
currently granted by the league. Next, part four will dive into the issues that have stemmed 
from the Commissioner’s granted powers. Part five will then explain the arbitration process 
for player discipline that the National Hockey League employs and why it is superior to 
the NFL’s policy. Lastly, part six will provide and explain a potential solution to the 
Commissioner’s current disciplinary authority based on the NHL’s process. 
 
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CBA 
 
 Notwithstanding the sharp increase in players facing discipline over the past 
decade, the Commissioner’s exclusive disciplinary powers have existed since the first CBA 
in 1968.16 The NFL Management Council (the “NFLMC”), which represents clubs and 
their owners, and the NFL Players’ Association (the “NFLPA”), which represents the 
players, collectively negotiate the NFL’s CBA.17 The CBA is essentially a labor agreement 
between both parties, with each side attempting to balance conceding rights and privileges 
in certain areas in order to receive support from the other side in areas they view as more 
important.18 This negotiation process includes attempting to reach an agreement on 
elements such as player safety, salary, revenue sharing, worker’s compensation and player 
discipline.19 Linchpins of the 2011 CBA included agreeing to new terms on revenue 
 
11. See id. 
 
12. See id. 
 
13. NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2016).   
 
14. NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 296 F. Supp. 3d 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).   
 
15. NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016).   
 
16. Mike Florio, Commissioner’s power under Article 46 has been present since the first CBA, NBC Sports 
(May 17, 2015, 7:18 PM), https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/05/17/commissioners-power-under-
article-46-has-been-present-since-the-first-cba/. 
 
17. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8. 
 
18. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8. 
 
19. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8. 
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sharing, rookie wage scales, and the salary cap, among other things.20 Notably, however, 
player discipline – and the commissioner’s power to discipline – were not a focus.21 
 
III. THE COMMISSIONER’S POWERS 
The Commissioner’s role in resolving disputes is initially articulated within the 
NFL’s Constitution & Bylaws.22 Here, the Commissioner is granted “full, complete and 
final jurisdiction and authority to arbitrate” player discipline.23  
Additionally, the Commissioner’s disciplinary powers are detailed in Article 46 of 
the CBA.24 The Commissioner is granted exclusive authority to essentially act as judge, 
jury, and executioner when handling player discipline.25 Specifically, the Commissioner is 
authorized to initially impose actions against players for “conduct detrimental to the 
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football.”26 Players are able 
to subsequently challenge these actions by appealing them through the NFLPA.27 However, 
as articulated by the CBA, and reaffirmed by the PCP,28 their challenges return to the 
Commissioner’s desk, as he is authorized to act as the sole arbiter in handling these 
appeals.29 The Commissioner is then directed to appoint one or more hearings officers to 
hear the appeal, but the Commissioner himself is authorized to serve as hearing officer in 
any appeal dealing with “conduct detrimental,” at his discretion.30 Thus, the final decision 
for this type of player discipline is subject to the absolute power of the Commissioner.  
 
 
20. Patrick Rishe, Who Won The 2011 Lockout?, Forbes (July 11, 2011, 10:44 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/07/21/who-won-the-2011-nfl-lockout/#24f0992e7071. 
 
21. See id. 
 
22. NFL, Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League, art. VII, § 8.6 




24. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8. 
 
25. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8. 
 
26. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8. 
 
27. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8. 
 
28. See NFL, Personal Conduct Policy (2016), 
https://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/photo/2017/08/11/0ap3000000828506.pdf. 
 
29. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8. 
 
30. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8. 
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When it went into effect, the aforementioned PCP slightly altered the scope of the 
Commissioner’s disciplinary authority articulated in the CBA.31 The new version was 
announced in 2014,32 and it was revised in 2016.33 Notably, the PCP provides that “[a] 
disciplinary officer will . . . investigate a potential violation . . . . The Commissioner will 
review the report and determine the appropriate discipline . . . . Appeals of any disciplinary 
decision will be processed pursuant to Article 46 of the CBA.”34 This new policy was, 
among other things, a result of the NFL’s botched handling of multiple player disciplinary 
matters near the end of the 2014 season.35 Because the new PCP removed the 
Commissioner’s role as sole arbitrator from the initial conduct hearing regarding 
disciplinary matters, it restricts his disciplinary authority to a certain extent.36 Instead, 
discipline is now investigated by a Special Counsel for Investigations and Conduct, as 
appointed by the NFL.37 However, the decision made by this appointed disciplinary officer 
remains under the delegated authority of the Commissioner.38 Further, notwithstanding this 
change to the Commissioner’s initial disciplinary powers, the PCP ultimately reaffirms the 
Commissioner’s powers to make the final decision on disciplinary matters.39 The 
Commissioner still retains his appellate powers when the league is faced with a player 
disciplinary matter.40 
In the events leading up to the NFL’s most recent PCP, the NFLPA advocated for 
a neutral, third-party arbitrator to have final say on player discipline.41 NFL representatives 
 
31. Karisa Maxwell, A Beginner’s Guide to Understanding the NFL Personal Conduct Policy, Vice (Dec. 8, 





33. Daniel Gallen, Lesean McCoy: What NFL personal conduct policy could mean for Harrisburgh native 
after domestic abuse allegations, Penn Live (July 10, 2018), 
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2018/07/lesean_mccoy_nfl_personal_cond.html.  
 
34. See NFL, The New Personal Conduct Policy, 
http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/photo/2014/12/10/0ap3000000441677.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 
2019). 
 
35. Maxwell, supra note 31. 
 




37. See id.  
 
38. See NFL, supra note 34.  
 
39. See NFL, supra note 34.  
 
40. See NFL, supra note 34. 
 




disagreed.42 For example, one NFL owner stated that, at that point in time, every owner 
was in agreement that the Commissioner should have final authority over player 
discipline.43 Despite their outcry, and their contention that the new policy should be 
collectively bargained,44 the NFLPA was ultimately uninvolved in the enactment of the 
new PCP.45  
IV. ISSUES WITH THE COMMISSIONER’S AUTHORITY 
Major issues stemming from the NFL Commissioner’s disciplinary authority have 
been highlighted over the past several years.46 These issues have tarnished the NFL’s 
reputation.47 Every party subject to the CBA would be better served with not only a change, 
but a complete overhaul of the Commissioner’s appellate power over player discipline. As 
stated in the 2011 CBA, the very purpose for the Commissioner’s authority is to eliminate 
“conduct detrimental to the integrity, or public confidence, in the game.”48 Ironically, the 
absolute power he wields in making the final ruling on these actions has been, in itself, 
detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the NFL.49  
 
A. THE IMPACT OF THE COMMISSIONER’S AUTHORITY ON PLAYERS 
The players would benefit from a new player disciplinary process because they 
truly per se suffer from the Commissioner’s role in wielding the proverbial player 




43. See id. 
 
44. Id.  
 
45. See Michael O’Keefe, NFL players union files grievance vs. NFL over new personal conduct policy, 
Daily News (Jan. 23, 2015, 11:14 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/nflpa-files-grievance-
nfl-new-conduct-policy-article-1.2089402. 
 
46. See Tara Sullivan, NFL’s system of justice an inconsistent mess, Boston Globe (July 23, 2019, 11:48 
PM),   https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/patriots/2019/07/23/nfl-system-justice-inconsistent-
mess/afP4zKBgEyOH1bvL0OIh4J/story.html (stating that little has changed over the years regarding 
player disciplinary matters in the “the NFL’s inability to deal with these incidents with any hint of 
consistency, any shred of credibility, or even one iota of accountability”).  
 
47. See Jon Helmkamp, NFL has huge hypocrisy problem with Seahawks Jarran Reed suspension, 
Fansided, https://12thmanrising.com/2020/05/06/seattle-seahawks-fans-need-stronger-together-t-shirt/ (last 
visited May 25, 2020).  
 
48. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8. 
 
49. See Helmkamp, supra note 47.   
 
50. Steve Stradley, What is Sensible Discipline for NFL Player Misconduct, Stradley Law Firm (Sept. 16, 
2014),  https://www.stradleylaw.com/blog/sensible-discipline-nfl-player-misconduct/.  
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suspensions has negatively impacted players reputationally and in their playing time.51 
This, in turn, has hit players where it hurts: their wallets.52 NFL players need a more equal 
way to determine their disciplinary punishment because they are the ones who are directly 
impacted by the flawed process.53 Further, players need more consistency so they can have 
a better idea of what to expect from the beginning and act accordingly. The negative impact 
of the current system is illustrated by player disciplinary actions and subsequent player 
cases against the NFL, which will be discussed now.    
1. TOM BRADY 
 A judicial assessment of the absolute power of the Commissioner arose in the 
“Deflategate” controversy involving New England Patriots’ quarterback Tom Brady.54 In 
this case, Brady was accused and later suspended for four games for his alleged 
involvement in a scheme to deflate footballs during the 2014 National Football Conference 
Championship game.55 Following the suspension announcement, Brady sought 
arbitration.56 NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell, serving as league arbitrator, entered an 
award confirming the discipline.57 The NFLPA, on behalf of Brady, sought judicial review, 
and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York vacated the award.58 The 
NFL subsequently appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.59 The court reversed 
the vacatur after noting the substantial deference courts are required to allow the arbitrator 
in labor agreements.60 The court relied on the “conduct detrimental” language from Article 
46 of the CBA in determining that Goodell properly exercised his broad discretion as 
arbitrator in resolving an intramural controversy between the NFL and a player.61 The court 
explained that “[i]t is the arbitrator's construction of the contract and assessment of the 
facts that are dispositive, however good, bad, or ugly.”62 Further, the court determined that 
“[i]f the arbitrator acts within the scope of this authority, the remedy for a dissatisfied party 
 
51. See id. 
 
52. See id. 
 
53. See id. 
 
54. NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016).   
 






58. Id.  
 
59. NFL Mgmt. Council, 820 F.3d at 531. 
 




62. Id. at 536. 
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is not judicial intervention, but for the parties to draft their agreement to reflect the scope 
of power they would like their arbitrator to exercise.”63 Thus, the court determined that in 
order for the players to combat the ability of the Commissioner to act as final arbiter over 
disciplinary matters, they would have to agree to a new process with the NFLMC in the 
next CBA.  
2. ADRIAN PETERSON 
In 2014, Goodell suspended Minnesota Vikings running back Adrian Peterson 
indefinitely for “conduct detrimental . . . to the game.”64 Peterson’s suspension was 
Goodell’s response to the state of Minnesota’s charges of misdemeanor reckless assault 
against Peterson.65 Peterson was charged with reckless assault based on an incident with 
one of his children.66 In addition to the suspension, Goodell fined Peterson.67  
The suspension was ultimately vacated by the district court of Minnesota after 
Peterson challenged it.68 Consequently, the NFL appealed, arguing that the fine should 
stand.69 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the parties were bound 
by the arbitrator’s decision.70 The court explained that “Article 46 and the Personal 
Conduct Policy by their terms place no limit on the Commissioner’s authority to suspend 
players.”71 The court further articulated that “[a]llowing the Commissioner or the 
Commissioner's designee to hear challenges to the Commissioner's initial decisions may 
present an actual or apparent conflict of interest for the arbitrator. But the parties bargained 
for this procedure, and the Association consented to it.”72 Thus, the Eighth Circuit also 
seemed to indicate that the only way to combat the Commissioner’s broad authority over 
player disciplinary matters is for the parties to agree to new terms in the next CBA.  
 
3. EZEKIEL ELLIOT 
 
63. Id. at 537. 
 
64. NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985, 989 (8th Cir. 2016).   
 












71. Id. at 995. 
 
72. Id. at 998. 
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In 2017, Goodell suspended Dallas Cowboys running back Ezekiel Elliot for six 
games.73 The suspension came after a league-sponsored investigation into domestic 
violence allegations against Elliot.74 The NFLPA subsequently filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the six-game suspension.75 The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York ultimately denied the motion.76 
In its analysis, the court emphasized the "narrowly circumscribed and highly deferential 
function that courts play” when tasked with reviewing arbitration awards.77 Further, the 
court aligned its reasoning with the Brady court in the other NFL Mgmt. Council case by 
explaining both the broad authority of the arbitrator and the judicial restriction on 
interpreting an arbitrator’s authority articulated in a labor agreement.78 Thus, the court 
affirmed Goodell’s ability to enforce his own impositions.79 
4. TYREEK HILL 
In one of the most recent cases implicating the Commissioner’s disciplinary role, 
Kansas City Chiefs wide receiver Tyreek Hill faced allegations for alleged battery against 
a juvenile.80 Hill did not face formal charges, but the NFL investigated him for allegedly 
breaking his son’s arm.81 Not long after the allegations rose, Hill was heard in an audio clip 
taken before the incident where he discussed potential child abuse.82 Hill has a history of 
domestic issues, which likely played a role in the Chiefs suspending Hill indefinitely.83 The 
NFL proceeded to conduct a four month investigation into the matter.84 At the conclusion 
 






76. Id. at 627. 
 
77. Id. at 621. 
 
78. See NFL Mgmt. Council, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 622–623; see also NFL Mgmt. Council, v. NFL Players 
Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527, 537 (2d Cir. 20160).  
  
79. See NFL Mgmt. Council, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 624. 
 
80. Emily Caron, Timeline of Events that Led to No Suspension for Tyreek Hill from the NFL, Sports 







83. Id. (In 2015, Hill plead guilty to charges of domestic assault and battery for punching and choking his 





of the investigation, Goodell and the NFL announced that Hill would not be punished.85 
Accordingly, Hill was then eligible to play.86  
 
5. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES FOR PLAYERS  
 
The NFL’s conclusion in the Tyreek Hill situation showcases the inconsistencies 
that stem from its current disciplinary policy. Other than Goodell’s final decision, Tyreek 
Hill’s case and Ezekiel Elliot’s case have a lot of similarities.87 Both cases lacked criminal 
charges.88 Both players raised doubts about the accusations against them.89 Both players 
maintained their innocence along with doubts about the truthfulness of the other parties 
involved.90 However, only Elliot was punished.91  
Hill was able to escape punishment where a number of other players have not. For 
example, Seattle Seahawks player Jarran Reed was suspended for six games as a result of 
domestic issue with less details available than in Hill’s incident.92 Baltimore Ravens player 
Jimmy Smith was suspended for “threatening and emotionally abusive behaviors” towards 
his girlfriend.93 A major difference, however, is that in Smith’s case, there were no 
allegations of physical abuse.94 Further, Hill was not punished for domestic allegations, 
while Brady was punished for allegations of deflating footballs.95 Brady even denied the 
allegations under oath.96 Although this was not a domestic issue, it was still an off-field 
disciplinary matter that fell within the Commissioner’s articulated powers.97 These 
suspensions, and many more, were handed out while Hill, a player with a history of 
domestic problems and a damning audio recording, escaped punishment.98 Unfortunately, 
 
85. Caron, supra note 80. 
 
86. See id. 
 






90. Id.  
 
91. Id.  
  















Hill is not the only player who faced heavily incriminating circumstances, yet escaped 
punishment.99 Accordingly, this comparative analysis is a testament to the dangerous 
inconsistencies of the NFL’s disciplinary policy and Goodell’s arbitrary judgment in his 
role as the sole final arbiter. These inconsistencies are concerning because they appear to 
showcase that Goodell’s objective is not necessarily justice for off-field transgressions, and 
that there may be other less righteous factors at play in his decision making. 
 
B. THE VALUE OF A NEW PROCESS FOR OWNERS 
The Owners would also benefit from a new process for player discipline in the new 
CBA. Under the current process, Goodell has hurt the reputation of the NFL with both his 
lack of review or discipline in certain situations and his overall inconsistent, erratic 
approach to player discipline.100 Consistency in practice and procedure is important to 
ensure the integrity of the disciplinary process and to avoid claims of unfairness.101  
The lack of consistency results in both players and fans losing faith in the NFL. 
Additionally, player suspensions have hurt TV ratings.102 The NFL at its core is a business, 
and less viewership hurts its bottom line.103  
Notably, some owners have specifically indicated that they are considering 
revisiting the NFL’s process for handling criminal allegations of players.104 Dallas 
Cowboys owner Jerry Jones said, “[W]e all know that we’ve had problematic aspects to 
our discipline, our investigations. We all know that those have been there.”105 Jones also 
previously stated that he believed the NFL needed to reevaluate its disciplinary 
procedures.106 Accordingly, it is likely in the best interest of owners to revise the player 
disciplinary process so public perception may improve and the League can maintain a more 
consistent approach. 
 
99. See Rachel Axon, Ray Rice case prompted NFL changes on domestic violence, but cases continue to test 
policy, USA Today (Sept. 18, 2019, 9:54 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2019/09/18/nfl-domestic-violence-ray-rice-tyreek-
hill-ezekiel-elliott-adrian-peterson/2215187001/.   
 
100. See Sullivan, supra note 46. 
 
101. See Wayne D. Garris & Christina Zebrowski, XpertHR Employment Law Manual 2256 (2019). 
 
102. See Erik Pedersen, Will Tom Brady’s Suspension Let The Air Out Of NBC’s NFL Opener?, Deadline 
(May 11, 2015 3:15 PM), https://deadline.com/2015/05/tom-brady-suspened-nfl-opener-steelers-nbc-
1201424809/ (discussing the impact of Tom Brady’s four game suspension to NBC ratings). 
 
103. See David Lantham, Fire Goodell #3: Jarran Reed Hypocrisy, Last Word On Pro Football (July 22, 
2019,  https://lastwordonprofootball.com/2019/07/22/fire-goodell-jarran-reed-hypocrisy/. 
 
104. Mark Maske, Some NFL owners want to revisit how the league conducts investigations, The Washington 









C. THE COMMISSIONER 
The Commissioner would benefit from losing his power to hear appeals in player 
disciplinary actions as well.107 As the Commissioner of the NFL, Goodell is both the face 
of the league and the scapegoat for problems and public criticism.108 His broad 
responsibilities include negotiating deals to bring revenue into the NFL, negotiating the 
collective bargaining deal with the players, player discipline, scheduling, and the rules of 
the game.109 If the authority to hear and rule on player discipline is removed from Goodell 
and placed in the hands of a third-party, Goodell would have more time to focus on his 
other responsibilities.  
Further, public perception is that Goodell has not performed well in his role as final 
arbitrator over player discipline.110 Consequently, Goodell would not have to face the 
media and public outcry from every player disciplinary decision that receives backlash if 
he is removed from this role. Goodell serves as a three way buffer of sorts between the 
owners, the players, and the general public because he is the Commissioner.111 
Consequently, Goodell has to juggle each group’s varying interests when handling player 
disciplinary matters and imposing suspensions in order to determine the best overall 
decision for the NFL.112 Generally, there are owners on both sides of the issues, and 
Goodell must attempt to appease everyone.113 He has received major and mounting 
criticism over the years in this role.114 Accordingly, both the perception of the 
 
107. See Marty Keane, Should We Say Goodbye to Goodell?, The Herald (Nov. 9, 2016), 
https://hhsherald.com/6313/sports/should-we-say-goodbye-to-goodell/.  
  
108. See Roger Goodell, Vanity Fair, https://www.vanityfair.com/people/roger-goodell (last visited May 
25, 2020).  
 




110. See George Stockburger, Roger Goodell Has Failed in His Duties as the NFL Commissioner, Fansided, 
https://nflmocks.com/2016/05/30/roger-goodell-has-failed-in-his-duties-as-the-nfl-commissioner/ (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2019).  
 
111. See Mark Leibovich, Roger Goodell’s Unstoppable Football Machine, The New York Times (Feb. 3, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/magazine/roger-goodells-unstoppable-football-machine.html.  
 
112. See id.  
  









Commissioner and the NFL’s reputation as a whole would likely benefit from the removal 
of his appellate powers over the player disciplinary process.115 
 
D. THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI DETERMINED THAT THE COMMISSIONER’S 
POWERS RELATING TO PLAYER DISCIPLINE, AS ARTICULATED BY THE CBA, ARE 
UNCONSCIONABLE 
Lastly, although not binding on the League, a state supreme court found that the 
Commissioner’s authority on player disciplinary matters made the CBA unenforceable.116 
In Hewitt v. Kerr, 461 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Mo. 2015), the Supreme Court of Missouri 
concluded that the Commissioner’s player disciplinary powers, as articulated by the CBA, 
are unconscionable.117 Todd Hewitt, a former employee of the St. Louis Rams, was able to 
successfully challenge the validity of the Commissioner’s absolute power.118 In this case, 
Hewitt sought a writ of mandamus requiring the St. Louis County circuit court to vacate 
its order compelling arbitration of his claim of age discrimination against the St. Louis 
Rams Partnership and three of its affiliates.119 In its holding, the Court determined that “the 
terms in the contract designating the [C]ommissioner, an employee of the team owners, as 
the sole arbitrator with unfettered discretion to establish the rules for arbitration are 
unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable.”120 Further, the court explained that “due to 
the lack of any terms in the employment contract or in any document incorporated into the 
contract, the contract appoints the commissioner as not only the arbitrator but as the person 
who controls virtually every aspect of the arbitration from establishing the rules and 
procedures to making the final decision.”121 Consequently, the court disagreed with the 
contract’s authorization for the Commissioner to subjectively determine punishment as he 
sees fit.122 The Court determined that Goodell’s powers, as articulated by the CBA, are not 
enforceable.123  
 
115. Justin Block, Everyone Should Celebrate Stripping Roger Goodell Of Disciplinary Power, HuffPost 






116. See Hewitt v. Kerr, 461 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Mo. 2015). 
 
117. Id.  
 
118. Id. at 813 
  
119. Id. at 803. 
 
120. Id. at 813. 
 







Despite the fact that because this case is a state law case it is not binding on the 
NFL, the court’s determination is notable in explaining why the position of the 
Commissioner should be stripped of its appellate authority for disciplinary matters. For the 
reasons set out above, this authority is detrimental for all parties involved and bound by 
the CBA. While not binding, the fact that a court has found the Commissioner’s authority 
to be unconscionable is a small step towards reduction of the Commissioner’s powers. 
 
V. THE NHL PLAYER DISCIPLINE PROCEDURE DEMONSTRATES A SUPERIOR, 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE NFL’S PROCEDURE 
 
In contrast to the NFL, the National Hockey League (the “NHL”) has a somewhat 
different procedure in handling player discipline.124 In the NHL’s CBA, the Commissioner 
or his designee is authorized to impose discipline for off-ice conduct.125 The NHLPA can 
subsequently appeal the discipline on behalf of the player to an impartial arbitrator.126 The 
impartial arbitrator is jointly appointed by the parties to serve for the duration of the 
agreement.127 Either party may discharge the impartial arbitrator by serving written notice 
upon the arbitrator and the other party by September 1st of each year.128  The parties are 
then required to agree upon a successor within 90 days.129 However, if the parties are 
unable to agree in that timeframe then an ad hoc arbitrator is selected under the Labor 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.130 He or she will preside until 
the parties are able to agree on a successor.131 Also, the impartial arbitrator is required to 
be selected from the National Academy of Arbitrators.132 
Notwithstanding its relative size and popularity in comparison to the NFL, the 
NHL’s player disciplinary process for off-ice conduct is superior.133 The use of an impartial 
arbitrator for appeals is pivotal in ensuring fairness to both sides throughout the 
proceeding.134 When reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the arbitrator decides 
 
124. See NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement (Sept. 16, 2012), https://www.nhlpa.com/the-pa/cba.   
 
125. See id. 
 
126. See id. 
 
127. See d. 
 
128. See id. 
 
129. See 2012 NHL CBA, supra note 124. 
 
130. See id. 
 
131. See id. 
 
132. See id. 
 
133. See Laurel Stout, The NHL Reigns King for Disciplinary Procedures, VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY (2017), 
https://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/law/academics/sportslaw/commentary/sls_blog/2017/1105.html (last 




whether the decision was supported by sufficient evidence and whether it was reasonable 
based on the facts and circumstances surrounding the conduct at issue, the proportionality 
of the offense and punishment, and the interests of the league and the player.135 This, in 
part, is why the NHL has a more just player disciplinary procedure than the NFL.136 
 
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION  
When the NFL and NFLPA meet to discuss their new CBA, the NFLPA is likely 
to propose a change to the commissioner’s disciplinary powers.137 Although they are 
unlikely to be able to get the NFLMC to agree to abolishing the PCP, there is a likelihood 
that they will be able to agree on amending the hearing process.138 The parties should strip 
the Commissioner of any power over the player discipline appeals process. Instead, the 
parties should institute an impartial arbitrator similar to the NHL’s process to ensure 
neutrality in final decisions.  
A comment from the VALPARAISO LAW REVIEw suggested that the Commissioner, 
the NFLPA, and the NFLMC should all separately choose an arbitrator from the American 
Arbitration Association Labor Arbitration Rules to serve on the independent arbitration 
panel.139 It is important to note that the comment was written in 2010, prior to the current 
CBA and PCP. Notwithstanding its age, the crux of the comment is still extremely relevant. 
The League needs to move towards an independent arbitration panel to represent player 
appeals.140 However, there are potential problems that may arise from allowing each the 
Commissioner and NFLMC to each select an arbitrator. If each of these parties is allowed 
a separate selection, there is likely inherent bias that will tip the scales of a three-person 
panel because the Commissioner is employed by the team owners,141 while the NFLMC 
specifically represents the owners.142 Consequently, this proposal would likely create a 
scenario where the owners have two representative parties selecting an “independent” 
arbitrator, while the NFLPA is allowed only one. Thus, there is potential for this proposed 
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new system of an independent arbitration panel to fail to serve the very purpose of its 
implementation in the new CBA.  
 Accordingly, in the new CBA, the NFL should essentially adopt the NHL’s 
procedure for handling player discipline appeals. The parties should authorize an 
independent arbitrator to hear appeals. This arbitrator should be agreed upon by both the 
NFLPA and the NFLMC, and each party should be eligible to discharge the arbitrator by 
providing notice both to the arbitrator and the other side by a specific date each year. The 
impartial arbitrator should be selected from an official list of arbitrators agreed upon by 
both sides, whether the list includes members of the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA), the National Academy of Arbitrators, or another similar arbitration agency. 
Further, in the event the parties are unable to agree, an ad hoc arbitrator should be selected 
under the Labor Arbitration Rules of the AAA. This proposal will ensure fairness and more 
balance when faced with player discipline. 
The NFLPA has proposed a similar solution to the aforementioned proposal.143 
They have advocated for a panel of three neutral arbitrators who are lawyers with a football 
background.144 However, the NFL and NFLPA would ultimately benefit from meeting in 
the middle in implementing the aforesaid proposal as part of the new player discipline 
process for the new CBA. This proposal allows each party to have some influence over the 
process, while ultimately leaving the decision to a neutral, third-party. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
With the expiration of the current CBA on the horizon, both the NFLMC and the 
NFLPA are evaluating areas of the CBA that they view as unfavorable. Accordingly, the 
NFL should retain its initial process for hearing player disciplinary matters. However, the 
Commissioner’s final authority over decisions regarding player discipline is an area that 
the NFLPA will likely strongly advocate to change. Notwithstanding the NFLPA’s 
problems with the Commissioner’s current articulated authority on these matters, removing 
these powers would also be beneficial to the NFL and the Commissioner himself. 
Accordingly, the NFL and NFLPA should agree to authorize an independent arbitrator to 
hear player discipline appeals.  
In implementing the aforementioned proposal, both sides would be able to ensure 
an equal process in coming to a neutral final decision. Changing to a neutral presiding 
arbitrator will have the desired effect of reaching an impartial decision where the players 
will feel more comfortable with the decision. Further, the NFLMC will not be represented 
by a party that seems inherently biased, and the Commissioner will have more time to focus 
on other important issues. As a result, the league as a whole would benefit from removing 
the Commissioners appellate powers over player discipline and enacting this neutral 
arbitration process.   
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